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GRAY MARKET GOODS AND THE FIRST SALE DOCTRINE:
THE LAST NAIL IN THE COFFIN?
Quality King Distributors, Inc. v. L'anza Research International, Inc.
523 U.S. 135 (1998)
John C. Roa*
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Copyright Act was seen as the "last bastion of hope for
stemming the flow of gray market imports" by many American manufacturers'
until the United States Supreme Court handed down its decision in Quality King
Distributors, Inc. v. L'anza Research International, Inc. on March 9, 1998.2 The
decision resolved a conflict between the Third and Ninth Circuits involving the
use of copyright law to prevent the unauthorized importation of an American
manufacturer's own products back into the United States.
The Court's ruling depended on how the justices interpreted the proper appli-
cation of the first sale doctrine,3 which allows a purchaser of a copyrighted item
to lawfully dispose of that item without authorization from the copyright holder.'
A unanimous Court found that the first sale doctrine limited a manufacturer's
ability to prevent unauthorized importation pursuant to section 602(a) of the
Copyright Act of 1976.' The Court's decision effectively shut the door on using
copyright law to prevent a company from having to compete against itself in the
marketplace when the copies are lawfully made and purchased from the copy-
right owner.
This Note will discuss the development of the first sale doctrine and the diffi-
culty courts had when trying to interpret the doctrine's effect on the prohibition
of the unauthorized importation of copyrighted works. This Note will also ana-
lyze the reasoning involved in the decision by the Supreme Court and discuss
why the holding appears to be correct given the history of the applicable provi-
sions. Finally, this Note will offer a suggestion of where manufacturers should
turn to solve their problems of gray market imports in a global economy.
* The author would like to thank Professor H. Lee Heatherington for his help and input in the writing of this
Casenote. The author additionally thanks his wife Deborah and daughter Brianna for the many months of
understanding and support during the development of this Note.
I. Darryl J. Adams, Recent Developments In Copyright Law, 6 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 317, 340 (1998).
2. Quality King Distribs, Inc. v. L'anza Research Int'l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135 (1998).
3. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1994).
4. Doris R. Perl, The Use of Copyright Law to Block the Importation of Gray-Market Goods: The Black
and White of It All, 23 Loy. L.A. L. Rav. 645, 657 (1990) (explaining that the "first sale doctrine extinguishes
the copyright owner's ... distribution rights [after) ownership has been transferred" by the copyright holder).
5. 17 U.S.C. § 602(a) (1994) (defining an unauthorized importation of copies purchased outside the United
States as an "infringement of the exclusive" rights of the copyright owner).
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II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Facts of Instant Case
L'anza Research International was a California corporation that manufactured
and sold various hair care products to domestic distributors.' These domestic
distributors then resold the hair care products only to authorized retailers in the
United States including barber shops, beauty salons, and professional hair care
colleges. Lanza copyrighted the labels that were used on its products sold
throughout the United States.' Lanza heavily advertised its products domestical-
ly through trade magazines and at the point of sale.9 L'anza also provided special
training to authorized retail outlets."0
In addition to its domestic distribution, U'anza sold its hair care products in for-
eign markets." However, Uanza did not advertise in those markets, which result-
ed in prices charged to foreign distributors that were 35% to 40% lower than
prices charged to domestic distributors." The products sold to foreign distribu-
tors had the same copyrighted labels as were used domestically.13
The shipment at the center of the dispute involved several tons of hair care
products which were purchased by a distributor in Malta." The Court could not
establish the exact chain of events leading to the shipment of products to Malta,
but the Court determined there was no dispute to the basic fact that the "goods
were manufactured by Uanza and first sold by L'anza to a foreign purchaser.""
The Court also determined that the goods were shipped back into the United
States "without the permission of L'anza," for distribution to "unauthorized
retailers" at lower prices from Quality King Distributors, Inc."8 Once again, the
Court could not establish a clear chain of events and assumed that the shipments
of hair care products were bought by Quality King from the Malta distributor."
Uanza discovered that its hair care products were being sold at an unauthorized
drug store in California through special marks used on each of its shipments to
allow "tracing.
18
6. Quality King, 523 U.S. at 138.
7. Id.
8. Id.









18. Brief for Respondent at 6-7, Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L'anza Research Int'l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135
(1998) (No. 96-1470).
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B. District Court
The discovery resulted in a lawsuit by Lanza against Quality King in February
19949 in the United States District Court for the Central District of California.2
Lanza alleged that Quality King had infringed on its "exclusive copyright distri-
bution rights" for the shipments of hair care products in dispute.21 Uanza further
contended that the shipments of hair care products were intended to be sold in
Malta, but that some of those products were imported back into the United States
in violation of the "distribution agreement" between the United Kingdom distrib-
utor and the Malta distributor.22 Lanza viewed the violation of the foreign distri-
bution agreement as an infringement of its exclusive distribution rights pursuant
to section 602(a) of the Copyright Act of 19762' because the shipments were
never intended to be shipped back into the United States.'
Quality King raised an affirmative defense of the "first sale doctrine," arguing
it had the right to dispose of the shipments after buying them legally2 1 Quality
King based its argument on section 109(a) of the Copyright Act of 1976, assert-
ing that the language "provides a complete defense to any copyright infringement
action" brought against it.2" Section 109(a) provides that anyone who legally
obtains a good protected by a copyright may dispose of that same item "without
the authority of the copyright owner."27
The district court held that even in cases such as this, where the products were
originally made in the United States and were then sold to a foreign distributor,
the sale was considered as occurring "outside the United States" and precluded
the application of the first sale doctrine as a defense. 8 The court found that
"Congress intended to protect the domestic copyright holder's right to distribute
copies in the United States without having to compete" with its own products "or
refrain from selling its copies at different prices for different markets."29 Thus,
the district court found Lanza owned all rights in the hair care products shipped
back into the United States and that the first sale doctrine in section 109(a) did
not protect Quality King from liability? Lanza sought damages from Quality
King in a separate state tort action.
3 1
19. (d. at 6.
20. Uanza Research Int'l v. Quality King Distribs., Inc., No. 94-00841-JSL, 1995 WL 908331 (C.D. Cal.).
21. Id. at *1.
22. Id.
23. See 17 U.S.C. § 602(a) (1994) ("Importation into the United States, without the authority of the owner of
copyright under this title, of copies or phonorecords of a work that have been acquired outside the United States
is an infringement of the exclusive right to distribute copies or phonorecords under § 106... .
24. L'anza Research, 1995 WL 908331 at *1.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a)(1994).
28. L'anza Research, 1995 WL 908331 at "2. The District Court declined to adopt the holding from the
Third Circuit in Sebastian Int7 v. Consumer Contacts, 847 E2d 1093 (3d Cir. 1988), which permitted the use of
the first sale doctrine as a defense to unauthorized importation when a good manufactured in the United States
was shipped to a foreign distributor and then brought back into the domestic market.
29. Lanza Research, 1995 WL 908331 at *3.
30. Id. at 04.
31. The state court action went to trial in April of 1995. A jury found for Uanza, establishing "by clear and
convincing evidence that Quality King had acted with malice and fraud against Uanza." Uanza Research Int'l,
Inc. v. Quality King Distribs., Inc., 98 F.3d 1109, 1112 & n.2 (9th Cir. 1996).
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LA W RE VIEW
C. Ninth Circuit
Quality King then appealed the district court's injunction to the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals. 2 Quality King alleged several errors of the lower court-the
most important being the rejection of the first sale defense and a refusal to adopt
the holding by the Third Circuit in Sebastian International, Inc. v. Consumer
Contacts, Ltd.3 Quality King asserted that the first sale defense would be a bar
to any copyright infringement action against it because the Third Circuit held in
Sebastian that the doctrine would act as a complete defense when the copies
were "made and sold in the United States."34
This was a case of first impression for the Ninth Circuit .3  The court rejected
the holding by the Third Circuit in Sebastian36 after an analysis of the district
court rulings and the legislative intent underlying sections 106(3), 109(a), and
602(a) of the Copyright Act of 1976.1' The Ninth Circuit found that Congress'
lack of clear legislative intent behind the Copyright Act, combined with the fact
that l'anza would not receive full value for its products in the United States if it
had to compete against its own cheaper, imported copies, rendered the Third
Circuit's ruling without authority.' Therefore, the court reasoned that the first
sale doctrine did not apply to legally made copies imported into the United States
without authority of the copyright owner.3 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the
first sale doctrine applied only when the owner had received full value for its sale
of the legally made goods to a third party, which could not happen if unautho-
rized imports forced the domestic prices down."
The Ninth Circuit went further when it concluded that the Third Circuit's deci-
sion in Sebastian "missed the crucial point"-that section 602(a) was designed
by Congress to prevent "the evil" of a copyright owner losing control of the
domestic distributors because of unauthorized imports." Thus, the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the first sale doctrine of sec-
32. Id. at 1109.
33. Id. at 1112. The other errors alleged by Quality King include: (I) finding that Uanza adequately proved
that Quality King had bought the products outside the United States and without Uanza's permission; (2) reject-
ing Quality King's "unclean hands defense" which alleged that part of Uanza's shipment had been intended to
possibly end up in Libya, which would have violated Executive Order 12543 (Jan. 7, 1996) and 31 C.ER. §
550.409 (establishing a trade embargo to Libya); (3) rejecting an allegation that Uanza did not own copyrights
to some of the products imported by Quality King and thus could not bring a lawsuit on all of the goods
because it lacked standing; and (4) finding that the lower court's injunction was too broad and did not specify
when Quality King was or was not in violation of the injunction. Id. The Ninth Circuit rejected all of the argu-
ments listed here. Id. at 1120. See note 28 supra for the holding in Sebastian that was rejected by the lower
court.
34. L'anza Research, 98 F.3d at 1112-13. See also Sebastian Int'l Inc. v. Consumer Contacts, Ltd., 847 F2d
1093, 1098-99 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that the place of manufacture and whether the owner actually sold the
copies would be dispositive, and not the location of the sale).
35. Lanza Research, 98 F3d at 1113.
36. Id. at 1114.
37. See id. at 1113-17.
38. Id. at 1117.
39. Id. at 1120.
40. Id. at 1116-17. The Ninth Circuit applied the reasoning from a district court decision involving goods
both manufactured and first sold outside the United States, stating that the first sale doctrine would violate con-
gressional intent if the copyright owner did not realize full value for the disposition of each copy. See Parfums
Givenchy v. C & C Beauty Sales, 832 F Supp. 1378, 1391 (C.D. Cal. 1993).
41. Lanza Research, 98 F3d at 1117.
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tion 109(a) of the Copyright Act of 1976 did not bar an infringement action by a
copyright owner against anyone who imported lawfully made copies into the
United States without the copyright owner's authorization.' 2
D. Supreme Court
Quality King then appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which granted
the petition for certiorari.' 3 The Supreme Court considered only the question of
"whether the 'first sale' doctrine endorsed in section 109(a) is applicable to
imported copies."" In a unanimous decision, the Court reversed the Ninth
Circuit, holding that "[t]he whole point of the first sale doctrine is that once the
copyright owner places a copyrighted item in the stream of commerce by selling
it, he has exhausted his exclusive statutory right to control its distribution."' 5
III. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF THE LAW
A. Congress 'Power to Grant Copyrights
The United States Constitution expressly gives Congress the power to create
and regulate copyrights.' 6 This power includes the authority to grant a limited
monopoly to authors for their writings." However, this power is to be used to
encourage authors to create works that the public will have access to "after the
limited period of exclusive control has expired."' 8 The authors are only given
"monopoly privileges" for a limited time if the copyright statutes are not "pri-
marily designed to provide a special private benefit.""9 Therefore, Congress must
balance the interests of the artists and authors against the benefits of public
access to their works."0 This balancing has led Congress to frequently amend the
patent and copyright statutes, especially with the development of new technologies.51
B. Earliest Restrictions on Unauthorized Importation
Restrictions on importing copies without authorization were enacted as early as
1790.5? Those restrictions involved the manufacture of unauthorized copies.5"
Subsequently, the Copyright Act of 1891 appeared to prevent the importation of
copyrighted books without the author's permission.5 ' Section 4964 of the
Copyright Act of 1891 prohibited anyone from copying or importing any copy-
42. Id. at 1120.
43. Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L'anza Research int'l, Inc., 520 U.S. 1250 (1997).
44. Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L'anza Research Int'l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135 (1998).
45. Id. at 152.
46. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cf. 8. This clause gives Congress the power "[t]o promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts" by allowing an "exclusive right" for a "limited" time to writings and discoveries of authors and
inventors.




51. Id. at 429-30.
52. Perl, supra note 4, at 652-53.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 653.
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righted work, or selling any copy of a book known to be copied, without permis-
sion of the holder of the copyright."5
Prior to 1891 and shortly thereafter, several lower court cases had addressed
the issue of whether the buyer of a copyrighted work could dispose of that same
work without permission of the copyright owner, or if the copyright owner
retained control over works she had already sold."6 These early lower court cases
applied the concept of the first sale doctrine, creating case law on when first
sales extinguished the copyright owner's control."
C. First Sale Doctrine Expands
While the lower court cases consistently applied the first sale doctrine, the con-
cept was first endorsed 8 by the United States Supreme Court in Bobbs-Merrill
Co. v. Straus.'a Bobbs-Merrill brought the lawsuit to prohibit the sale of a novel,
entitled The Castaway, for which it owned the copyright.6" The action was
brought against Isidor and Nathan Straus, owners of Macy & Co. 1 The lawsuit
was dismissed in the district court, and the dismissal was affirmed on appeal. 2
Bobbs-Merrill then appealed to the Supreme Court.63
Macy's had purchased copies of The Castaway to sell them at retail.6' Macy's
bought the books from wholesale dealers, with the vast majority of the books
costing Macy's 40% less than the retail price. Bobbs-Merrill had included a
printed notice on the inside cover of each book that the retail sale of any copy
must be at a price of $1, with a warning that to sell for less than $1 would "be
treated as an infringement of the copyright." 6 The wholesale dealers knew of the
notice in each book but were not contractually obligated to enforce the terms of
the notice for Bobbs-Merrill.67 After purchasing the books from the wholesalers,
55. Id.
56. Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. Uanza Research Int'l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 140 & n.4 (1998). The footnote
string cites a number of pre-1891 cases that applied the first sale doctrine. See citations infra note 57.
57. See Kipling v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 120 E 631, 634 (2d Cir. 1903) (holding that the purchase of unbound
copyrighted books also conveyed the right to bind the sheets and resell them); Doan v. American Book Co., 105
F 772, 776 (7th Cir. 1901) (holding that the purchase of a copyrighted book in a first sale also conveys the right
to repair the book as needed by the purchaser); Harrison v. Maynard, Merrill & Co., 61 E 689, 691 (2d Cir.
1894) (holding that the first sale of rights removes the owner's rights); Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Snellenburg, 131 F
530, 532-33 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1904) (holding that even when the copyright holder prints a notice in a copy of each
book sold, the purchaser is free to resell that book at a different price. The original owner may have an action
of breach of contract, but not copyright infringement); Clemens v. Estes, 22 F 899, 900 (C.C.D. Mass. 1885)
(holding that a publisher can buy a book from an agent who lawfully purchased it, and the publisher can then
sell that book at any price without permission of the author); Stowe v. Thomas, 23 F Cas. 201, 206-07
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1853) (No. 13,514) (holding that a translation of a book is not an infringement).
58. See Quality King Distribs., Inc., v. L2anza Research Int'l, Inc., 535 U.S. 135, 140 (1998) (explaining the
Supreme Court's history of the first sale doctrine).
59. Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908).







67. Id. at 342.
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Macy's then sold the lawful copies at $.89 per copy without permission from
Bobbs-Merrill.68
Bobbs-Merrill argued that the copyright acts should be interpreted the same
way patent acts were interpreted for the purposes of securing rights for
inventors.' However, the Court held that there are differences between the pro-
tections granted by the copyright acts and those granted by the patent acts.70
Thus, the Court considered Bobbs-Merrill a case of first impression and ana-
lyzed it under the copyright statutes.?
The Court stated that it had already established that copyright property was
governed entirely by statutory law and "depends upon the right created under the
acts of Congress."" The Court also stated that the copyright statute's main pur-
pose is "to secure the author the right to multiply copies of his work."'7" The
Court then looked at the provisions in the Copyright Act of 1891 to determine
whether an owner of a copyrighted work lost all rights in the work after a lawful
sale.7 '
Section 4952 of the Copyright Act of 1891 granted any person with a copy-
righted work "the sole liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing, completing,
copying, executing, finishing, and vending the same."7" Bobbs-Merrill's argu-
ment focused on section 4952, arguing that the provision allowed the copyright
holder to sell a work while being able to reserve "so much of the right as he
pleases."7" The Court held that the language of the statute did not create any
rights for the copyright holder to impose a reservation by notice to limit future
sales of the work when there was no privity of contract between the holder and
the purchaser.77 The Court found (1) that the owner of the copyright sold a quan-
tity of books at a price "satisfactory to it" and, (2) that to allow future control
over the price when the books were subsequently sold "would give a right not
included in the terms of the statute."
78
This decision in 1908 thus interpreted the exclusive right of vending under the
1891 copyright statute as being limited to the first sale of the work. 9 The Court's
interpretation of the first sale doctrine was then adopted by Congress and codi-
fied into federal law in the Copyright Act of 1909.0 However, the 1909 Act did
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 346. The Court quoted from a decision by Judge Lurton, who wrote: "There are such wide differ-
ences between the right of multiplying and vending copies of a production protected by the copyright statutes
and the rights secured to an inventor under the patent statutes, that the cases which relate to the one subject are
not altogether controlling as to the other." (citing John D. Park & Sons Co. v. Hartman, 153 F 24 (6th Cir.
1907)).
71. Bobbs-Merrill, 210 U.S. at 346.
72. Id. (citations omitted).
73. Id. at 347.
74. Id. at 347-48.
75. Copyright Act of 1891, § 4952, 26 Stat. 1107, cited in Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. Uanza Research
Int'l, 523 U.S. 135, 138 & n.5 (1998).
76. Bobbs-Merrill, 210 U.S. at 349.
77. Id. at 350.
78. Id. at 351.
79. Quality King, 523 U.S. at 141-42 (1998).
80. Id. at 142 & n.7 (citing first sale doctrine in section 41 of the Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat.
1084 and in section 27 of the 1947 Act, ch. 391, 61 Stat. 660). See also Perl, supra note 4, at 654-55.
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nothing more than the 1891 Act in the way of restricting "the importation of arti-
cles that were either first sold or manufactured under the authority of the copy-
right owner.""1 Few cases were ever brought involving violations of importation
rights under the 1909 Act, therefore there were "no determinative judicial inter-
pretations" to guide copyright owners and manufacturers.82 Thus, copyright
holders and manufacturers had little ability to prevent the importation of their
own goods once the first sale had been made.
D. Copyright Act of 1976
The Copyright Act of 1976 was the end result of thirty-five studies conducted
by Congress to analyze the problems with the 1909 Act. 83 Another fifteen years
of hearings and revisions followed before the Copyright Act of 1976 was enacted
and signed into law.8
The Act of 1976 and recent amendments grant all copyright holders six exclu-
sive rights in section 106, including the right "to distribute copies or
phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of
ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending."85 Section 106 is also subject to sec-
tions 107 through 120, which limit the exclusive rights granted in section 106.86
The first sale doctrine is codified in section 109(a) of the 1976 Act and
expressly states that "[n]otwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3), the
owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title, or any
person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the authority of the copy-
right owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or
phonorecord."87 Congress explained that section 109(a) refers to any copyrighted
work "lawfully made under this title," even without the authorization of the copy-
right owner."
The Act of 1976 includes section 602, which establishes two classes of import-
ed goods.89 Section 602(a) creates an infringement of section 106's exclusive
distribution rights when the importation into the United States occurs "without
the authority of the owner of copyright under this title, of copies or phonorecords
of a work that have been acquired outside the United States. 9  Three exceptions
to section 602(a) serve to protect importation rights for use by a government, for
the private use of the person doing the importation, and for educational or reli-
81. Per], supra note 4, at 654-55 (arguing that the importation rights under the Acts of 1891 and 1909
remained narrow for copyright holders).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 656 & n.75.
84. Id. at 656 & nn. 77-79.
85. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994) (exclusive distribution rights granted in section 106(3)).
86. Id. Compare H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 36 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5674.
87. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1994). Section 109 is one of the limitations placed on section 106; see supra note
80.
88. See H.R. REp. No. 94-1476, at 79-80 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659 (giving an example
that a "pirated" phonorecord could not be resold without an infringement, but a phonorecord "legally made
under the compulsory licensing provisions of§ 115" could be resold without an infringement).
89. 17 U.S.C. § 602 (1994). See also Perl, supra note 4, at 657-58 (describing the two classes of imported
goods in more detail).
90. 17 U.S.C. § 602(a).
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gious purposes" The second class of goods involves items illegally made and
then imported into the United States. 2
Violations under sections 106 and 109 are enforced by section 501, which cre-
ates an infringement of copyright against "[a]nyone who violates any of the
exclusive rights of the copyright owner as provided by sections 106 through 118
... or who imports copies or phonorecords into the United States in violation of
section 602."11 The only explanation of section 501 applicable in the instant case
was the statement that under section 602 "an unauthorized importation of copies
or phonorecords acquired abroad" would be an infringement of the exclusive
fight of distribution.'
The sections in the Copyright Act of 1976 applicable to this instant case sur-
vive as of this date, with the latest attempts to amend the first sale doctrine com-
promised out of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act that was given final
approval by Congress on October 12, 1998. 91
E. Cases Since 1976 Involving First Sale and Importation Rights
There were few appellate court cases involving the question of how the first
sale doctrine of section 109(a) affected the distribution rights granted in section
602(a) and section 106(3). However, district courts grappled with the question
in a number of contradictory cases.9 7 One of the first was Columbia
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Scorpio Music Distributors, Inc."'
In Scorpio, CBS, a New York corporation, owned six sound recording copy-
rights."9 CBS consented to allow CBS-Sony, a Japanese corporation, to enter into
an agreement authorizing a Philippines corporation to manufacture and sell copies
of those six recordings in the Philippines. CBS retained the copyrights for the
recordings in the United States.' On November 2, 1981, CBS-Sony cancelled its
manufacturing and licensing agreements with the Philippines corporation.0 2
Before the severing of the agreements, the Philippines corporation had already
sold some of its copies of the copyrighted recordings to a Philippines music dis-
tributor, which then sold the recordings to an importer.0 3 Some six thousand
copies of the copyrighted recordings ended up being purchased by Scorpio
Music, a Pennsylvania corporation.0 4 CBS-Sony had agreed to give the
91. Id.
92. 17 U.S.C. § 602(b).
93. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a).
94. H.R. REp. No. 94-1476, at 271 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5774 (explaining the relation-
ship between section 501 and sections 106 through 118 as well as section 602).
95. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-796 (1998), reprinted in 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 645. This report accompanied
H.R. 2281 to explain the compromises made by the Conference Committee. A provision on the first sale doc-
trine and gray market goods was removed from the House's version of the Act by the Conference Committee.
96. Perl, supra note 4, at 665-66.
97. Id.
98. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Scorpio Music Distribs., Inc., 569 F Supp. 47 (E.D. Pa. 1983), affd mem.,
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Philippines manufacturer sixty days to sell its inventory after termination of the
agreement.' The six thousand copies owned by Scorpio had been sold in the
Philippines within that sixty-day period.'
CBS' complaint alleged that Scorpio had imported copies of copyrighted
recordings without authorization in violation of section 602 of the Copyright
Act."0 7 Scorpio argued that the first sale doctrine of section 109(a) prevented a
third party from being liable for copyright infringement because the sale of the
copied records was a "valid first sale" from the Philippines manufacturer to the
Philippines music distributor.'
The court held that the phrase "lawfully made under this title" in section
109(a)0 9 granted first sale protection to a "third party buyer of copies which have
been legally manufactured and sold within the United States and not to pur-
chasers of imports such as are involved here.""' The court granted CBS' motion
for summary judgment, holding that if section 109(a) could supersede the impor-
tation prohibitions in section 602, the language in section 602 would be "virtual-
ly meaningless," allowing third party buyers to circumvent the Copyright Act by
purchasing the recordings indirectly."'
The question of how the first sale doctrine applied to goods manufactured and
sold within the United States was the central issue of Cosmair, Inc. v. Dynamite
Enterprises, Inc."2 Cosmair was a corporation exclusively licensed to distribute
in the United States various Ralph Lauren fragrance and cosmetic products."
3
Cosmair sued two United States companies that were discovered importing the
Ralph Lauren products into the United States.""
Cosmair alleged that the importation of the products by the defendants without
authorization violated section 602(a) of the Copyright Act of 1976."1 The defen-
dants argued that section 602(a) was limited by the first sale doctrine of section
109(a), which would protect the right to sell goods legally made and then sold by
the copyright owner. "', The defendants further argued that section 602(a), as
interpreted by Scorpio Music,"7 only applied when a foreign manufacturer
licensed to distribute abroad imported the copies into the United States."'
The court found it unclear whether the goods were actually sold in the United
States, although it did conclude that the products were manufactured domestical-
ly."9 The court held that this case would be treated as if the products were sold
-105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 48.
108. Id.
109. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1994).
110. Scorpio Music, 569 F. Supp. at 47, 49.
111. Id. at 49-50.
112. Cosmair, Inc. v. Dynamite Enters., Inc., 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 344 (S.D. Fla. 1985).
113. Id. at 345.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 346.
116. Id.
117. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Scorpio Music Distribs., Inc., 569 F. Supp. 47 (E.D. Pa. 1983), affd mem.,
738 F.2d 424 (3d Cir. 1984).
118. Cosmair, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 344, 346.
119. Id. at 347.
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in the United States and that the first sale provision of section 109(a) would limit
section 602(a)'s importation exclusion in such a situation.," Thus, the motion for
a preliminary injunction by Cosmair was denied. 2 '
The next major case involved the importation of books in Hearst Corp. v.
Stark."' The authors of eighteen titles entered into agreements with Hearst to
publish the United States editions of those books and granted Hearst the exclu-
sive United States copyrights to those titles.'23 The same eighteen titles were also
published under similar agreements with a publisher in the United Kingdom.124
However, copies of the United Kingdom editions were sold by the publishers to
a United Kingdom wholesaler, who then sold them to the defendant-the sale
resulted in the books being imported into the United States. 2 ' Defendants and
amici curiae argued that the books imported from the United Kingdom were not
available in the United States.'26 The plaintiffs argued that because they owned
the exclusive rights in the United States to these eighteen titles in question, the
importation of those books violated section 602(a).'27 The court could not deter-
mine whether the titles were actually available in the United States and added
that its decision did not depend on such information.'
In addition, the defendants contended that section 109(a) limited the applica-
tion of section 602(a) in this situation.'2 9 The court held, however, that even if
section 109(a) did modify section 602(a), the first sale doctrine would not help
the defendants in this case. 3 ° Defendants were importing large quantities of
books for "multiple resales in the United States." '' The court concluded that
section 109(a) only applied to the "resale of a 'particular copy.' " 32 Furthermore,
the court held that because section 109(a) was not mentioned in section 602, then
the first sale doctrine did not have any relation to section 602(a) where there was
a large wholesale importation of goods manufactured abroad.'" The court's rea-
soning turned on the phrase "of a particular copy" in section 109(a). The court
related this phrase to the exclusive distribution right of section 106(3) '2 and con-
cluded that it was a limitation on one or a few copies rather than on large quanti-
ties imported at the same time."
120. Id.
12 I. Id. at 348.
122. Hearst Corp. v. Stark, 639 F. Supp. 970 (N.D. Cal. 1986). Another important issue was whether the First
Amendment could limit section 602(a) when a product such as a book was involved. The court held that the
First Amendment was not violated by the prohibition on importing books into the United States when there was
a valid copyright.
123. id. at 972 & n.3.
124. Id. at 972.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 972-73.
127. Id. at 973.
128. Id.




133. Id. at 977.
134. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1994) (expressly mentioning the exclusive distribution right in section 106(3)
and not referring to section 602).
135. Id.
136. Hearst Corp., 639 F Supp. at 976.
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The next case that impacted the application of the first sale doctrine to exclu-
sive distribution rights was TB. Harms Co. v. Jem Records, Inc."' T.B. Harms
was a California corporation that licensed and marketed copyrighted musical
compositions. 38 One of its copyrights was to the song "O1' Man River."'" Jem
was a New Jersey corporation that manufactured, sold, and distributed
phonorecords in the United States. " '
A version of the song "O1' Man River" was recorded by singer Frank Sinatra
and included in a sound recording with fifteen other musical compositions.""
Copies of the sound recording were lawfully manufactured and distributed in
New Zealand through a business that had the right to make and distribute sound
recordings embodying the musical compositions owned by T.B. Harms.4 2 These
sound recordings were subsequently imported and distributed in the United
States by defendant Jem.' Jem did not have permission from T.B. Harms to
import or distribute recordings of "O1' Man River," nor did it have such permis-
sion from the copyright owners of the other fifteen musical compositions on the
phonorecord. 44
T.B. Harms alleged an infringement on its exclusive copyright through the
unauthorized importation pursuant to section 602(a).' s Defendant Jem argued
that there was no violation of section 602(a) because there had to be an exclusive
distribution right under section 106(3), and the compulsory licensing provision
under section 115 limited the right in section 106(3).'" The court held that the
limitations of sections 107 through 118 do not extinguish the exclusive rights
available to the copyright holder under section 106(3) and that, according to
Scorpio, section 109(a) did not apply to the buyers of imports.' 7 Thus, the provi-
sions limiting the section 106(3) exclusive distribution right were held not to
extinguish those exclusive rights in every situation. '"
In Sebastian International, Inc. v. Consumer Contacts, Ltd.," 9 a fact situation
similar to the instant case was considered by the Third Circuit.' Sebastian
involved a California corporation that manufactured and marketed personal care
beauty supplies. 5 ' Two of the items had labels affixed that were copyrighted.' 2
Sebastian made an oral contract with defendant Consumer Contacts that allowed
137. T.B. Harms v. Jem Records, Inc., 655 E Supp. 1575 (D.N.J. 1987).
138. Id. at 1576.
139. Id. at 1516 & n.1 (explaining that copyrights in the musical composition and in the sound recording are
separate and distinct copyrights and are, therefore, treated differently).
140. TB. Harms, 655 F Supp. 1575-76.





146. Id. at 1578-80.
147. Id. at 1582-83. See also Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Scorpio Music Distribs., Inc., 569 F. Supp. 47, 49
(E.D. Pa. 1983), affdmem., 738 F.2d 424 (3d Cir. 1984), and Perl, supra note 4, n.177.
148. TB. Harms, 655 F. Supp. at 1580.
149. Sebastian Int'l, Inc. v. Consumer Contacts, Ltd., 847 E2d 1093 (3d Cir. 1988).
150. Id. at 1094. The court referred to the copyright infringement claim as a disguise for the real intention of
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Consumer Contacts to distribute the plaintiff's personal care products to beauty
salons in South Africa.
15 3
Sebastian shipped four containers of its products with copyrighted labels to
Edenvale, South Africa, in January 1987.15' Consumer Contacts then shipped the
unopened containers back to the United States where they were released by cus-
toms five months later.15 ' Sebastian first obtained a preliminary injunction
against distribution of the products in district court.5 6 Sebastian then amended
its breach of contract complaint to allege that a company known as Fabric, Ltd.
had possession of the shipment and was infringing the copyrights on the labels."7
The district court lifted the original restraining order when it determined that
Fabric, Ltd. was not aware of the contract between Sebastian and Consumer
Contacts. 1' However, the court decided that the copyrighted labels were protect-
ed by the Copyright Act and issued a preliminary injunction against infringe-
ment." The district court viewed the first sale doctrine as a limitation on the
right to vend and not as a prohibition against importation, regardless of where
the products "'were first sold or first manufactured.""'
On appeal to the Third Circuit, the defendant argued that the first sale doctrine
extinguished the claim for copyright infringement."6 ' The Third Circuit agreed,"2
holding that section 602(a) did not add a separate right apart from section 106(3)
to control distribution, but that section 602(a) instead "serves only as a specific
example of those rights subject still to the first sale limitation."'6 3 The court
found that because section 109(a) limits section 106(3), the first sale doctrine
must also limit section 602(a). ' The court also reasoned that the copyright
holder apparently received its full price for the goods when first sold, and there-
fore, all exclusive rights of distribution were extinguished and could not be
"infringed by importation."'65
In dicta, the Third Circuit urged Congress to resolve the bigger question of
gray market goods, calling such disputes over product labels "superficial"
because, in reality, the disputes are over the products themselves.'
BMG Music v. Perez"6 7 established the Ninth Circuit's split with the Third
Circuit in a decision that held the first sale doctrine inapplicable to unauthorized




156. Id. at 1094-95.
157. Id. at 1095.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. (quoting Sebastian Int'l, Inc. v. Consumer Contacts, Ltd., 664 F Supp. 909, 920 (D.N.J. 1987)).
161. Sebastian Int 7, 847 E2d at 1095. Consumer Contacts did not challenge the validity of the copyrights,
reserving the issue for the district court hearing on the preliminary injunction. Consumer Contacts also argued
that Sebastian did not show irreparable harm, but the Third Circuit did not address the issue.
162. Id. at 1099.
163. Id. at 1097.
164. Id. at 1099.
165. Id.
166. Id. The Third Circuit also stated that the gray market problem should not be resolved "by judicial exten-
sion of the Copyright Act's limited monopoly."
167. BMG Music v. Perez, 952 E2d 318 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1206 (1992).
168. Id. at 319.
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sold sound phonorecords in the United States and owned the copyrights to the
sound recordings embodied therein. 69 BMG alleged that defendant Perez pur-
.chased copyrighted BMG sound recordings manufactured abroad and imported
them into the United States where they were sold in violation of section 602(a)."'
The district court granted a preliminary injunction against Perez; however,
while the injunction was in place, Perez sold BMG's copyrighted works made
abroad without BMG's permission.171 Perez was found to be in contempt by the
district court and to have willfully infringed on BMG's copyright.'72 Perez
appealed, contending that he did not infringe on the copyright because he was
protected by the first sale doctrine."3
The Ninth Circuit held that the first sale doctrine granted protection "only to
copies legally made and sold in the United States.""' Thus, the decision of the
district court was affirmed.1
7 5
In a situation similar to BMG, the Ninth Circuit again considered the relation-
ship between the first sale doctrine and the importation rights of section 602(a)
in Parfums Givenchy, Inc. v. Drug Emporium, Inc."'7 In this case, Givenchy USA
owned a United States copyright to the box design for a particular perfume.'
7
7
The perfume itself was manufactured in France by Givenchy France, which
owned Givenchy USA. " 8 Before Givenchy France assigned its rights in the
design copyright to Givenchy USA, third parties lawfully purchased the perfume
and imported it into the United States without permission."
Drug Emporium purchased the imported perfume from the third parties and
began selling it in its chain of drugstores. 8 ' Drug Emporium made all of its pur-
chases subsequent to Givenchy USA becoming the copyright owner of the per-
fume box design. 8' The district court granted a permanent injunction against
Drug Emporium, resulting in an appeal to the Ninth Circuit.'82
On appeal, Drug Emporium argued that the first sale doctrine codified in sec-
tion 109(a) protects it from a copyright infringement under section 602(a)."a
Givenchy USA argued that "the importation right survives as to a particular copy








175. Id. at 319-21 &n.3.
176. Parfums Givenchy, Inc. v. Drug Emporium, Inc., 38 F3d 477 (9th Cir 1994).






183. Id. Drug Emporium also argued that there was no infringement of the unauthorized importation provi-
sion because Givenchy USA did not own the copyright until the perfume had already been imported. Id. at 479
& n.2. The court held that the Copyright Act protects copyright holders against both an unauthorized importa-
tion and subsequent distribution, citing BMG Music v. Perez, 952 E2d 318, n. 187 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
505 U.S. 1206 (1992). Id.
184. Parfums Givenchy, 38 F.3d at 481.
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The Ninth Circuit stated that to follow the reasoning of Drug Emporium would
"deprive U.S. copyright holders of the power to authorize or prevent imports of
the copies once the copies are sold abroad by the manufacturer."'85 The court
further explained that this issue has other policy considerations because it
involves gray market goods, which are goods containing a valid U.S. trademark
or copyright "typically manufactured abroad, and purchased and imported into
the United States by third parties, thereby bypassing the authorized U.S. distribu-
tion channels.""'
The Ninth Circuit followed its reasoning in BMG Music' and held that the
importation protection granted under section 602(a) did survive as long as the
first sale was not within the United States."'
IV INSTANT CASE
The split between the Third and Ninth Circuits led the United States Supreme
Court to hear arguments in Quality King Distributors, Inc. v. L'anza Research,
International." Justice Stevens began the analysis of the decision by referring
to Quality King as "an unusual copyright case"'90 because there was no claim that
unauthorized copies of the copyrighted labels were made by anyone."8' Instead,
the opinion noted that the action by Uanza sought the protection of the way it
marketed "the products to which the labels [we]re affixed."'92 The Court did not
consider the issue of gray market goods relevant to the copyright issue at stake. '93
A. Issue
The Supreme Court in Quality King limited its decision to the issue of whether
the first sale doctrine codified in section 109(a) "is applicable to imported
copies." 9 ' In deciding the issue of the first sale doctrine as applied by the
Copyright Act, the Court stated that its interpretation of the statutes had a much
broader application than the question of product labels.' 5 The Court also applied
its decision to other "copyrighted materials such as sound recordings or
books." 9"
185. Id. at 481 &n.6.
186. Id. See also K Mart v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 286-87 (1987) (explaining that the problem of gray
market goods in a trademark case limited the use of trademark law to prohibit the importation of gray market
goods).
187. See BMG Music v. Perez, 952 F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1206 (1992).
188. Parfums Givenchy, 38 F3d at 481.
189. Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L'anza Research Int'l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135 (1998). The Ninth Circuit held
that the first sale doctrine did not limit section 602(a) even when the product was first manufactured in the
United States and sold abroad.
190. Id. at 140.
191, Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 153. See also id. at 138 (listing nine amicus curiae briefs involving the question of gray market
goods or parallel importation).
194. Id. at 138.
195. Id. at 140.
196. Id.
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B. Arguments
The Court did not analyze the arguments of petitioner Quality King and
focused on the arguments asserted by respondent Lanza. '  Generally, Uanza
argued that section 602(a) prohibits unauthorized competition from foreign dis-
tributors who buy exported American products and then import them into the
United States.19" Lanza asserted that the language of section 602(a) creates a
separate right that stands alone from section 106(3)'s exclusive distribution right,
and therefore, this right would not be limited by the first sale doctrine of section
109(a).199 In addition, Lanza argued that if section 602(a) were limited by the
first sale doctrine, then section 602(a) would have no meaning and that the
enforcement provisions of section 501 refer separately to violations of sections
106 and 602.2"0
The Court also considered the argument of the United States Solicitor General,
who asserted that the term "importation" in section 602(a) was "an act not pro-
tected by the language in § 109(a)" that permitted a "subsequent owner" to dis-
pose of the copy in any manner. 1 The Solicitor General also argued that the
term "importation" was "neither a sale nor a disposal of a copy under §
109(a)."2°2
C. Supreme Court Analysis
The Court began its analysis by establishing that the first sale doctrine limited
the exclusive right to sell a copyrighted work to the "first sales of the work."20
Justice Stevens explained that this decision was later codified into the Copyright
Act of 1909 becoming section 109(a) and limiting section 106(3) in the
Copyright Act of 1976.204 The Court pointed out that the decision in Bobbs-
Merrill made a "critical distinction between statutory rights and contract
rights,"20 5 and it dismissed L'anza's assertion that "contractual provisions" would
not prevent foreign distributors from unauthorized importation of gray market
goods. The Court's analysis instead focused on the statutes in the Copyright
Act.
20 6
The Court then found it "significant" that the language of section 602(a) did
not "categorically prohibit the unauthorized importation of copyrighted materi-
197. Id. at 139-44. Cf Brief for Petitioner, Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. Uanza Research Int'l, Inc., 523 U.S.
135, n. 189 (1998) (No. 96-1470) and Petitioner's Reply Brief. The Court adopted Quality King's arguments.
198. Quality King, 523 U.S. at 143.
199. Id. at 145.
200. Id. at 145-46.
201. Id. at 146. See also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 8-9, Quality
King Distribs., Inc. v. Lanza Research Int'l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135 (1998) (No. 96-1470).
202. Quality King, 523 U.S. at 151; see also Brief for the United States, supra note 201.
203. Quality King, 523 U.S. at 141-42 (referring to the landmark decision in Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210
U.S. 339 (1908)).
204. Id.
205. Id. at 143 & n.10. Seealso Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908).
206. Quality King, 523 U.S. at 142-44.
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als."20' Instead, the Court held that section 602(a)'s importation prohibition was
an infringement of the exclusive distribution right stated in section 106(3)."8 In
addition, the Court found that the language of section 106 "expressly states that
all of the exclusive rights granted by that section-including, of course, the dis-
tribution right granted by subsection (3)-are limited by the provisions of §§ 107
through 120.'09
The Court then looked at the applicable provision, section 109(a), which
"expressly permit[s] the owner of a lawfully made copy to selithat copy
'[n]otwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3). ' '21° Moreover, the Court
found that section 109(a)'s first sale doctrine allowed any purchaser subsequent
to the first sale of the copyrighted work "lawfully made under this title" to
become the owner, regardless of whether the reseller was domestic or foreign."'
Further, the subsequent owners would then be entitled to sell that item without
permission of the copyright holder.212
The Court's reasoning resulted in the main holding that section 602(a)'s impor-
tation prohibition applied only to the exclusive right of distribution in section
106(3); therefore, any right by lawful owners to resell copyrighted works under
section 109(a) limited both sections 602(a) and 106(3).213 Thus, section 602(a)
would not prevent domestic or foreign owners of Uanza's products from import-
ing and reselling them in the United States after a first sale had been made.214
In considering the argument by Uanza that section 602(a) would be meaning-
less if it were limited by section 109(a), the Court held that section 109(a) gave
protection only to lawful owners; therefore, "any non-owner. such as a bailee, a
licensee, a consignee, or one whose possession of the copy was unlawful" would
be an infringer under section 602(a)."' Thus, section 602(a) would not be mean-
ingless even with the limits of section 109(a). 1 In addition, section 602(a)
applied to copies legally made under the laws of another nation, not to copies
legally made under the laws of the United States Copyright Act.217
The Court further analyzed LUanza's assertion that section 501 's enforcement
provisions referred separately to sections 106 and 602.2"8 In response, the Court
held that section 106 is also limited by sections 107 through 120. If section 602
stood alone, therefore, none of the other limitations would apply, including the
fair use defense of section 107."' Given the importance of a fair use defense, the
207. Id. at 144. See also 17 U.S.C. § 602(a) (1994) ("Importation into the United States, without the authori-
ty of the owner of copyright under this title.., is an infringement of the exclusive right to distribute copies or
phonorecords under § 106... * ).
208. Quality King, 523 U.S. at 144.
209. Id. See also 17 U.S.C. § 106(1994).
210. Quality King, 523 U.S. at 144. See also 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1994).




215. Id. at 146-47.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 147.
218. Id. at 149. See also 17 U.S.C. § 501 (1994).
219. Id. at 149-50. See also 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994) (allowing the use of copyrighted works without permis-
sion in endeavors such as news reporting, teaching, and commenting).
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Court reasoned that Congress could not have intended section 602 not to be lim-
ited by section 107220 Therefore, if section 107 limited section 602, the other
enumerated limitations, including section 109(a), would limit section 602 as
well.
221
The Court also found the Solicitor General's argument that importation under
section 602(a) did not carry the same meaning as sale or disposal under section
109(a) to be "unpersuasive. '' 22 The Court reasoned that in the normal situation, a
person imported items with the plan of selling or disposing of them, and the act
of selling or disposing included "the right to ship [the items] to another person in
another country."
223
Justice Ginsburg filed a concurring opinion in the unanimous decision by the
Court. 4 Justice Ginsburg's short statement pointed out that the Quality King
decision was limited to a situation where the copyrighted goods are made in the
United States, shipped abroad, and then imported back into the United States.2
The concurrence recognized that the situation where the "infringing imports
were manufactured abroad" was still left unresolved. 26
V ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court's decision in Quality King extends far beyond the interpre-
tation of the first sale doctrine in the Copyright Act limiting the prohibition on
imports found in section 602(a). The decision may also have a "major impact"
on American companies which export products that are at least partially protect-
ed by copyrights. 27
A. Gray Market Goods
The Court decided the issue of the first sale doctrine without a decision on the
issue of gray market goods. The Court was aware that the question of using
copyright law to prevent unauthorized imports was at the heart of the case,22 yet
it set that issue aside and focused only on the question of the first sale doctrine
and section 602(a)." However, the opinion pointed out that the Court believed
respondent Uanza could have avoided many of its problems by either advertising
abroad and charging higher prices or selling the hair care products under a differ-
ent name in overseas markets.23 ° Thus, while not explicitly deciding the issue of
220. Id. at 151.
221. Id. at 150-51.
222. Id. at 151-52.
223. Id. at 152.
224. Id. at 154.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. First Sale Rule Limits Redress Against Gray Market Goods, 10 No. 4 J. PROPRIETARY RTs. 12 (1998).
228. Quality King, 523 U.S. at 140 (acknowledging that respondent really wanted to protect its products from
unauthorized imports and was less concerned about the copyrighted labels).
229. Id. at 153 ("[Wlhether or not we think it would be wise policy to provide statutory protection for such
price discrimination is not a matter that is relevant to our duty to interpret the text of the Copyright Act").
230. Id. & n.29.
[VOL. 20:211
GRAY MARKET GOODS AND THE FIRST SALE DOCTRINE
whether gray market goods should be controlled, the Court was aware of the pos-
sible results when it put an end to the use of copyright law to prohibit imports
when the copyrighted products are first manufactured in the United States and
then exported."a
While the main issue in the instant case involves the Copyright Act, the parties
and interested observers put forth arguments that were intertwined with the ques-
tion of gray market goods. 2 ' A gray market, in a situation like the instant case, is
created when legally made goods are bought by third parties not authorized to
distribute the items; the third parties then import the goods back into the United
States for resale.23 These goods compete with the trademark holder's authorized
goods,23' often at a sharply lower price, especially with goods such as cosmetics,
which are offered domestically only to "upscale markets.
235
Gray market goods have become a threat to many United States businesses and
have had a substantial impact on the domestic marketplace.236 Many of these
businesses turned to copyright law after running into problems with contractual
provisions and trademark protection."' Until recently, most of the judicial inter-
pretation of the Copyright Act involving gray market goods came at the district
court level, with differing opinions on the protection offered to businesses.23
The question that was left unanswered was whether section 109(a) limited sec-
tion 602(a), or whether section 602(a) created an exclusive right that stood
alone.2"'
In light of the statutory language of the applicable copyright provisions, the
legislative history of the Act, and the past legislative decisions involving gray
market goods and the first sale doctrine, the Supreme Court appears to have
answered that question appropriately.
B. First Sale Doctrine and Distribution
There are four provisions in the Copyright Act of 1976 that bear on the ques-
tion of unauthorized imports infringing on a copyright holder's exclusive right to
distribution: sections 106(3), 109(a), 501(a), and 602(a). As the Court detailed
231. Id. at 144.
232. Id. (describing briefly the interest in gray market goods in connection with focusing only on the
Copyright Act).
233. Donna K. Hintz, Battling Gray Market Goods with Copyright Law, 57 ALB. L. REv. 1187, 1188 (1994);
see also K Mart v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 286 (1988) (describing the different types of gray markets that
can be created).
234. Hintz, supra note 233.
235. Lawrence M. Friedman, Business and Legal Strategies for Combating Grey-Market Imports, 32 INT'L
LAW 27, 28 (1998).
236. Per, supra note 4, at 678.
237. Id. at 648-51. See also K Mart, 486 U.S. 281 (restricting how far trademark laws can be used to keep out
gray market goods).
238. Perl, supra note 4, at 649-52.
239. Id. at 675. See also Hintz, supra note 233; John C. Cozine, Note, Fade to Black? The Fare of the Gray
Market After Uanza Research International, Inc. v. Quality King Distributors, 66 U. Ct. L. REV. 775 (1998)
(suggesting that Congress should settle the split between the Third and Ninth Circuits in a casenote published
before the Supreme Court decision in the instant case).
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in Quality King, the analysis begins with the language of section 106,4' which
grants "[e]xclusive rights in copyrighted works."2 ' Section 106(3) explicitly
grants the exclusive right "to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyright-
ed work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or
lending." '242
The legislative history of section 106(3) explains that the provision grants the
copyright holder "the right to control the first public distribution." ' 3 Congress
made its intent crystal clear that section 109 ends the copyright holder's rights
under section 106(3) "with respect to a particular copy or phonorecord once he
has parted with ownership of it."2 4 The provision also expressly states that sec-
tions 107 through 120 limit the exclusive rights granted in section 106.245
The language of section 109(a) begins with the words "[n]otwithstanding the
provisions of section 106(3).""6 The provision goes on to state that the owner of
any copy "lawfully made under this title . . . is entitled, without the authority of
the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or
phonorecord."24 7 The legislative history of this provision states that once the
copyright holder makes a first sale of the copy, the new owner would not be
affected by the holder's "exclusive right of distribution," and the owner has the
right to "transfer it to someone else or destroy it.""48 The copyright holder can
limit the new owner's rights by contract, but any restrictions cannot be "enforced
by an action for infringement of copyright."2 '9
Thus, the interaction between sections 106(3) and 109(a) give the copyright
holder the exclusive right to distribute copies until a first sale is made. The right
to control is then completely transferred to the new owner. It logically follows
then that once a copyright owner sells its products to be distributed overseas, the
right to control distribution in foreign markets ceases. None of the cases ana-
lyzed in this Note interprets the relationship between sections 106(3) and 109(a)
differently. Considering the language used in the two provisions and the clear
legislative history explaining congressional intent, there can be no doubt that
section 109(a) is meant to limit the exclusive distribution right of section 106(3).
C. Importation Prohibition
The bigger question is whether section 602(a) stands alone or is an extension
of section 106(3) and is, therefore, limited by section 109(a). Section 602(a)
states that unauthorized importation into the United States of copies that are
240. Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. Uanza Research Int'l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 142 (1998).
241. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994).
242. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (1994).
243. H.R. REp. No. 94-1476, at 39 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5675.
244. Id.
245. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994).
246. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a)(1994).
247. Id.
248. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 79 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5693.
249. Id.
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bought "outside the United States is an infringement of the exclusive right to dis-
tribute .. under section 106, actionable under section 501.'" ° The legislative
history does not mention section 109; however, its explanation states that the
"mere act of importation" would be an infringement of the exclusive distribution
rights where the copies were "lawfully made" and imported without the copy-
right holder's authority." ' On the surface, the history and language appear to
favor the interpretation that section 602(a) stands alone as an additional exclu-
sive right.
However, the language of section 602(a) itself states that unauthorized impor-
tation is an "infringement of the exclusive right to distribute ... under section
106. ''212 That statement relates section 602(a)'s prohibition on unauthorized
importation to section 106(3)'s exclusive distribution right. Section 602(a)'s pro-
hibition on unauthorized importation is, therefore, an extension of section
106(3), and an independent provision.
Section 50 1(a) only clouds the issue. The language of section 501(a) creates
an infringement of copyright for anyone violating the exclusive rights granted in
"sections 106 through 118 ... or who imports copies or phonorecords into the
United States in violation of section 602."2 Thus, the language alone appears to
place section 602 as standing separate from section 106(3). Congressional intent
explained in the legislative history only serves to clarify the question a little. It
states that under section 602, "an unauthorized importation of copies or
phonorecords acquired abroad is an infringement of the exclusive right" to dis-
tribute." Therefore, section 501(a) establishes an infringement under section
602(a) when the copies are bought outside the United States.
The logical conclusion about goods manufactured and copyrighted inside the
United States before export would be that Congress did intend for section 602(a)
to stand alone in that situation. Otherwise, Congress would have either specifi-
cally provided for such occurrences or explained its intent when it alluded to
copies bought outside the United States.
However, lower court cases interpreted this same statutory language and leg-
islative history to reach different conclusions. In Scorpio, the question involved
copies of records made abroad and then imported into the United States.2"' The
district court held that section 109(a) did not limit section 602(a) in this case,
finding a copyright infringement.255 Scorpio does little to settle the question in
the instant case because the language of section 602(a) specifies that copies
legally made but acquired abroad would be an infringement.
Hearst was similar to Scorpio, in that copies legally made overseas were
imported into the United States, violating a domestic copyright. 57 Here, the dis-
250. 17 U.S.C. § 602(a) (1994).
251. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 298 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5786.
252. 17 U.S.C. § 602(a) (1994).
253. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1994).
254. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 271 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5774.
255. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Scorpio Music Distribs., Inc., 569 F Supp. 47 (E.D. Pa. 1983), aff d mem.,
738 F2d 424 (3d Cir. 1984).
256. Id. at 49.
257. Hearst Corp. v. Stark, 639 F Supp. 970, 972-74 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
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trict court focused on the phrase "of a particular copy" in section 109(a) as the
key to when the first sale doctrine applied2" Hearst involved a large wholesale
importation of copies. The Hearst court found that section 602(a) would prohibit
importation in that situation, but might not if only a few copies were at issue." 9
TB. Harms is another decision involving copies made abroad and imported
into the United States in violation of a copyright.2 In TB. Harms, the district
court allowed section 602(a) to stand alone, holding that section 109(a) did not
apply to buyers of imported copies.
26 1
The Ninth Circuit then held that the first sale doctrine did not apply to unau-
thorized imports in two cases involving goods manufactured overseas and
imported into the United States.21 2 The reasoning employed in BMG was fol-
lowed by the Ninth Circuit in Parfums Givenchy, indicating that the importation
prohibition in the Copyright Act was an important right for American manufac-
turers in combating the gray market.
The specific question of applying the first sale doctrine to goods made in the
United States is a recent issue. Cosmair involved a situation closer to the instant
case. In Cosmair, products made in the United States were treated as being
imported and resold in the United States.2 ' The district court held that in such a
situation the first sale doctrine would limit section 602(a) because the goods
were manufactured domestically.265 Thus, the court did not consider the place of
sale to be as important as the place of manufacture and viewed Congress' intent
regarding section 602(a) as applying to goods manufactured abroad.6"
Finally, in Sebastian, a case that is factually similar to the instant case, the
Third Circuit held that the first sale doctrine would limit an infringement action
under section 602(a).67
The cases all looked at the same legislative histories and statutes, yet the out-
comes were often contradictory. The question of what Congress intended was
resolved in different ways with different results in the courts. The reason for the
confusion becomes clear when the language of the statutes, the legislative histo-
ries, and the case law are considered together. Congress intended the four provi-
sions to work together when the Copyright Act of 1976 was adopted, because
legislative history does not explain the "ambiguous relationship between §§
109(a) and 602(a)."2
258. Id. at 976.
259. Id.
260. T.B. Harms v. Jem Records, Inc., 655 E Supp. 1575, 1576-77 (D.N.J. 1987).
261. Id. at 1583.
262. BMG Music v. Perez, 952 F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1206 (1992); Parfums
Givenchy, Inc. v. Drug Emporium, Inc., 38 F.3d 477 (9th Cir. 1994).
263. See Parfums Givenchy, 38 F.3d at 481 & n.6.
264. Cosmair, Inc. v. Dynamite Enters., Inc., 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 344, 346-48 (S.D. Fla. 1985).
265. Id. at 347.
266. Id.
267. Sebastian Int'l v. Consumer Contacts, 847 F.2d 1093 (3d Cir. 1988). This case also involved hair care
products with copyrighted labels affixed that were made in the United States, sold abroad, and then imported
for resale in the United States.
268. Hintz, supra note 233, at 1212.
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D. Congressional Intent
Congressional intent became much more apparent after the Supreme Court's
decision in Quality King.20 Congress amended the 1976 Copyright Act with the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 270 approved by Congress on October 12,
1998.1
Shortly after the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Quality King, the
House amended its version of the new Act to provide gray market protection by
changing the first sale doctrine. The proposed amendment by the House clari-
fied the first sale provision of section 109(a) by replacing the current first sen-
tence with the following statement:
notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3), the owner of a particular law-
fully made copy or phonorecord that has been distributed in the United States by
the authority of the copyright owner... is entitled, without the authority of the
copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or
phonorecord." a
The language of the amendment makes it clear that the House wanted to use the
first sale doctrine to limit the gray market by making it applicable only when a
copy would be distributed by the copyright holder's authority.
The Senate did not go along with the amendment, taking it out of the bill and
forcing a conference committee to settle the differences. 74 Senator Ashcroft
argued against the first sale doctrine on the Senate floor, questioning the amend-
ment and wondering "what relation the provision has to a recent Supreme Court
decision." ' The proposed amendment was viewed as a measure "to control
unauthorized imports of copyrighted works."27
Thus, Congress had a clear opportunity to use the first sale doctrine to keep
out gray market goods and it failed to do so. In fact, Congress has introduced at
least five bills in the past several years to curb gray market goods. None have
been passed .27  Therefore, modem Congressional intent appears to allow gray
market goods into the United States and to disallow the importation restriction in
section 602(a) of the Copyright Act of 1976 to be used in lieu of an express fed-
eral statute.
269. Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L'anza Research Int'l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135 (1998).
270. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-796 (1998) (accompanying H.R. 2281, also known as the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act).
271. 56 PAT. TRADEMARK & CoPYIw J. (BNA) No. 1396, at 694 (Oct. 15,1998).
272. 67 U.S.L.W. No. 14, at 2216 (Oct. 20, 1998).
273. 144 CONG. REc. H7074-03 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1998) (amended H.R. 2281 read for vote on passage).
274. See supra note 272.
275. 144 CoNG. REc. S9935-01, S9936-37 (daily ed. Sept. 3, 1998) (statement of Sen. Ashcroft).
276. See supra note 272.
277. See Petitioner's Reply Brief at 15 & n.17, Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. Lanza Research Int'l, Inc., 523
U.S. 135 (1998) (No. 96-1470) (citing S. 894, 102d Cong. (1991); H.R. 3484, 101st Cong. (1989); S. 626, 101st
Cong. (1989); S. 2903, 100th Cong. (1988); S. 1671, 100th Cong. (1987)).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court stated in the Quality King decision that the holding applies
beyond products with copyrighted labels, explaining that the Court's "interpreta-
tion of the relevant statutory provisions would apply equally to a case involving
more familiar copyrighted materials such as sound recordings or books." '278
Therefore, it follows that the Court will limit all but unlawfully made imports by
the first sale doctrine, regardless of the type of product. Thus, copyright law can-
not be used to keep out unauthorized imports.
Still, the decision by the Supreme Court in Quality King appears to be correct
in light of the language in sections 106(3), 109(a), and 602(a). The legislative
histories are inconclusive; however, the plain language in those provisions clearly
shows that Congress wanted to use section 602(a) as an extension of section
106(3), which would be limited by section 109(a). The recent passage of the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act illustrates that the obvious Congressional
intent is that gray market goods cannot be kept out of the United States using
copyright law.
Therefore, American manufacturers and copyright owners will have to exercise
self-protection because copyright law provides only limited protection. Where
only part of a product is copyrighted, such as in the instant case, changing the
name of the goods or charging higher prices to foreign distributors may be the
best course of action. In a situation where the products themselves are fully
copyrighted, the only protection a copyright holder may have is to charge prices
high enough at the time of the first sale to fully compensate herself against unau-
thorized imports. The ultimate answer to gray market goods may depend on a
political compromise by Congress, although the desire to forge an acceptable
solution does not appear to be widespread in the House or in the Senate.
Bobbs-Merrill first endorsed the doctrine of first sale, allowing the lawful pur-
chaser of a copyrighted work to do as she wished with the copy, extinguishing all
rights in the copy held by the copyright owner. Ninety years later the first sale
doctrine has been reaffirmed by the Supreme Court, leaving the doctrine intact
and stronger after the Quality King decision.
278. Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L'anza Research Int'l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 140 (1998) (emphasis added).
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